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288 F.3d 571 (4th Cir. 2002)
L Fas
On May 18,1983, Irvin and Rose Bronstein ("the Bronsteins") were bound,
gagged and stabbed twelve times in the chest. Their residence was ransacked and
propertyincluding television sets, a car, and jewelrywas taken. On May20,1983,
the Bronsteins' son found the bodies of this elderly couple. John Booth-El
("Booth-El") and William "Sweetsie" Reid ("Reid") were charged with the
murders. 1
The first trial for Booth-El ended in a mistrial because the prosecution
failed to disclose the statement of the Bronsteins' neighbor, who claimed to have
seen the couple the day after the murder, and the grand jurytestimonyof Charles
Westry, who claimed to overhear Daiyl Brooks admit to the murder of Mr.
Bronstein before trial.2 In the second trial, the prosecution argued that Reid
killed Mrs. Bronstein and that Booth-El killed Mr. Bronstein. The State's
argument was based largely on two facts: there were two knives at the crime
scene and the couples' wounds were different? Booth-El was convicted of first-
degree murder, robbery and conspiracy. The jury sentenced Booth-El to death
for the murder of Mr. Bronstein."
Petitioner appealed the sentence and the Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed because the introduction
of victim impact statements at a capital sentencing proceeding violated the
Eighth Amendment.5 At the new sentencing proceeding, the jury sentenced
Booth-El to death. The Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated that sentence
because the trial judge refused to admit evidence regarding parole eligibility.6
Booth-El was sentenced to death a third time in 1990.! In 1997, Booth-El
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, raising twentyfour claims.! Among the claims that peti-
1. Booth-El v. State, 507 Ad 1098, 1103 (Md. 1986) (CBbodElIr).
2. Booth-El v. State, 481 A.2d 505, 506-07 (Md. 1984) (CBov&EIP').
3. Booth-Elv. Nugh, 288 F.3d 571,574 n.1 (4th Ar. 2002) (CBaEIIV").
4. Id at 574.
5. Booth-El v. Maryland, 482 US. 496, 509 (1987) ("Boo&wEl IIr), ozwnai by Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 US. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a
capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact statements).




tioner argued were the following four (1) a 1983 change to the Maryland death
penaltystatute, removing intoxication fromthe list of statutorymitigating factors,
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States
Constitution; (2) the sentencing judge erred in giving a coercive instruction; (3)
Booth-El was denied due process when the trial judge denied bifurcation of the
1990 sentencing proceedings; and (4) an allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel during the 1984 guilt phase of trial.'
On the second dayof thedeliberations in 1990, the sentencing jurytold the
judge that it was unable to come to an agreement on the issue of whether Booth-
El was a principal in the first degree. Booth-El asked the judge to discharge the
jury and impose a life sentence. The judge denied his request. Instead, the judge
delivered an Allen charge in which he re-instructed the jury on the law and
advised them to continue deliberations. The next day, the jury returned a sen-
tence of death.1"
Booth-El asked that the verdict form contain the Maryland statute that
included intoxication as a mitigating factor. This request was denied." On direct
appeal, Booth-El asserted that refusal to include the pre- amendment language on
the verdict form violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 2 He argued that it required
him to prove bya preponderance of the evidence that intoxication was a mitigat-
ing factor." The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the sentence on direct
appeal. The trial court denied Booth-El post-conviction relief. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the denial, except as to an alleged Brady violation,
which it remanded. Following an evidentiaryhearing, the post-conviction court
denied relief and Booth-El was denied leave to appeaL'
Booth-El's petition for habeas corpus included a claim that he was denied
due process when the judge refused to bifurcate the 1990 sentencing proceed-
ing.' Booth-El argued that if the sentencing was bifurcated, then the jurycould
have determined whether he was a first-degree principal before any aggravating
and mitigating factors were presented.16 In Maryland, the defendant must be a
principal in the first degree to be eligible for the death penalty.17
Booth-El asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to the
guilt phase of his 1984 trial i He argued that his attorneys failed to investigate
9. Id at 574-75.
10. Id at 580-81.
11. Id at 576.
12. Bat EI1V, 288 F.3d at 576.
13. Id
14. Id at 574.
15. Id at 574-75.
16. Id at 575.
17. MD. CODE ANN., CRIES AND Pur.UMSHMENTS S 413(e)(1) (1957) (stating that only
principals in first degree qualify for death penak).
18. Boad-EIV, 288 F.3d at 583.
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and present "available evidence tending to disprove that Booth-El killed Mr.
Bronstein."" Booth-El also argued that his lawyers failed to object to one of the
three venire panels from which the trial jurors were selected on the basis that the
panel was tainted.2
Booth-El based his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district
court granted in part, on the ex post facto claim"1 The district court found that
no other claim merited relief." The State appealed, and Booth-El cross-appealed
the rejection of his claims regarding the A /& type charge, the refusal to bifurcate
the sentencing hearing, and ineffective assistance of counselt
II Hddig
The Fourth Cruit held that Booth-El was not entitled to relief.24 The
court stated that the change in procedure relating to intoxication as a mitigating
factor did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as it was applied by the United
States Supreme Court in 1995. The court found that the sentencing court did
not abuse its discretion when issuing the A U/n charge and that rejection of the
bifurcation claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal aw.26 Finally, the Fourth Caruit held that the defendant was not denied
effective assistance of counsel."
Ill A lzjui
A. Ex Post Facto Issm
The Ex Post Facto clause acts as a barricade against legislative tyranny by
assuring that legislative enactments give reasonable warning of their effect and
afford reliance on their meaning until clearly changed. ' At the time of the
19. Id
20. Id at 583-84.
21. Id at 575.
22. Id
23. Id;seeAllenv. Unted States, 164 US. 492,501-02 (18%) (allowingasupplementalcharge
given by the court when the jury has reached a stalemate in is deliberations and is incapable of
reaching an agreement).
24. Boo&EIIV, 288 F.3d at 574. The Fourth Crcuit reviewed Booth-El's claims under S
2254 standards. Id at 575; se28 US.C S 2254(d) (granting relief onlywhen decision is "contrary
to- or "unreasonable application of" federal iav, part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996).
25. Boc&EIIV, 288 F.3d at 578, 580.
26. Id at 582-83.
27. Id at 584.
28. SmWeaverv. Graham, 450 US. 24,28 (1981); sealsoCarmeliv. Texas, 529 U.S. 513,521
(2000) (detailing the background of the Ex Post Facto Cause and stating that the clause "prohibitfs]
legislative (a]cts 'contraryto the fust principles of the social compact and toeverypincipe of sound




Bronsteins' murders, Maryland law included intoxication as a mitigating factor."
The burden was on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that intoxication resulted in diminished capacity, if the jury found this fact, then
the statute deemed it a mitigating circumstance.3 On July 1, 1983, intoxication
was removed from this statute." After the change, defendants have the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both the fact that intoxication
resulted in diminished capacity and that it is a mitigating circumstance. 2
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, relying on Cdlim v YW#a Wn33 found
that there was no constitutional violation because the statutory change did not
fall within the three categories of ex post facto laws listed in Cdim These
three categories are as follows: (1) punishing as a crime an act previously com-
mitted; (2) making the punishment for a crime more onerous after its commis-
sion; and (3) denying any defense available at the time the act was committed."
The federal district court disagreed with the Maryland court and found that the
statute lowered the prosecution's burden of proof by increasing the burden
placed on the defendant. 6 The court found that the change fell within the fourth
ex post facto category-- "[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less, or different[,] testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender."37
The United States Supreme Court clarified this fourth category in 2000 in
CamdI vu Tcas3  The fourth category at issue in CvmA as well as in this case,
includes laws that alter the rules of evidence and/or permit less or different
29. MD. CODE ANN., GUIMEs AND PUNISJ-RME S 413(g)(4) (1982) (allowing juryto find
mitigating factor when "[tlhe murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminalityof his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
subsatlly impaired as a result of mental incapacity mental disorder, emotional disturbance, or
intoxication").
30. Bw'xbElIV, 288 F.3d at 576.
31. S&MD. CODE ANN., MES ANDPLSHMEWrS 413(g)(4) (Supp. 1987) ("The murder
was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantiallyimpaired as a result of mental
incapacity, mental disturbance or emotional disturbance.").
32. B&o-ElIV, 288 F.3d at 576.
33. 497 US. 37 (1990).
34. B l-EIIV, 288 F.3d at 576; seeColns v. Youngblood, 497 US. 37,52(1990) (defming
ex post facto categories and determining that the Texas statute in question did not fall within these
categories because it was a procedural change).
35. Bod>.ElIV, 288 F3d at 576; seC2d , 497 US. at 42 (isting the three categories of ex
post facto laws).
36. BoodthEIlV, 288 F.3d at 576.
37. Id (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 US. 386, 390 (1798)).
38. Se CAm?,? 529 US. at 513, 521-25 (defining the fourth category of ex post facto laws
as those that alter the legal rules of evidence and require less evidence to obtain conviction); seeao
Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,684 (4th Cr. 2001) (recognizing the fourth categoryof ex post facto laws




evidence to obtain a conviction. 9 Further, the Court stated that this is not
limited to laws that retrospectively alter the burden of proof for conviction, but
also extends to laws that reduce the qumzwn of evidence necessary to meet that
burden.' In CaV, the Texas statute in question permitted a conviction for
particular sexual offenses based on a victim's testimony alone; previously,
corroboration was required. 1 The Court held that the statute fell within the
fourth category of ex post facto laws and, therefore, was barred.42
Although it recognized that the fourth category continues to exist, the
Fourth Circuit held that this was not relevant to the issue at hand. 3 CQaknI was
decided eight years after the decision by the Maryland court." The Fourth
Circuit, relying on Wlianm v Taor,45 held that Q rdm was not precedent at the
time of the state court decision.' The Fourth Carcuit determined that the issue
in the case was not whether the state court unreasonably applied the Supreme
Court'sptmprecedent.47 Rather, the issue was whether the fourth categorywas
"clearlyestablished" at the time of the state court decision." The Court decided
that because the fourth category was not clearly established at the time of the
state court decision, that court could not unreasonably have applied clearly
established federal law.9
The court found four additional reasons for holding that there was no
violation of the Ex Post Facto CQause.' ° The court reasoned that the changes to
the Maryland statute onlyaffected the petitioner in a limited waybecause theydid
not deprive the petitioner of "'substantial personal rights."31 Further, the
amendment did not alter the rudiments of the crime of first-degree murder
during the commission of a robbery, nor did it change the fact that the crime was
punishable by death. 2 Moreover, the amendment did not discard intoxication
as a mitigating factor, it merely altered the procedure for determining whether
intoxication, if found, is a mitigator.3" The court found that this change was
39. BoadhEIIV, 288 F.3d at 576-77; Gmr, 529 U.S. at 522,530.
40. CvnmA 529 US. at 522-33.
41. Id at 517.
42. Id at 522.
43. BowEIIV, 288 F.3d at 577.
44. Id
45. 529 US. 362 (2000).
46. BoxEIIV, 288 F.3d at 577; seW'liars v. Taylor, 529 US. 362,412 (2000) (clrfying
that "clearly established federal lawl refers to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court at
the t of the relevant state court decision).
47. B&xdEIIV, 288 F.3d at 577.
48. Id
49. Id at 577 n3.
50. Id at 578-79.
51. Id at 580 (quoting Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 US. 180, 183 (1915)).
52. Id
53. BmijEIIV, 288 F.3d at 579.
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modest and did not disadvantage Booth-El in an important way.' Thus, the
court reversed the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus on this claim.
5
B. Allen ChvW
Booth-El claimed that the sentencing judge erred in giving an impermissible
coercive instruction after the jury suggested that "it was split on whether Booth-
El was a first degree principal."% He argued that the judge should have dis-
missed the juryand imposed a life sentence. Further, Booth-El contended that
the jury may have understood the charge as an instruction to return a death
sentence.5s Booth-El relied on Maryland law, which required the judge to impose
a life sentence if the jurycould not unanimouslydecide on a sentence of death.s9
The Fourth Crcuit, relying on Alm UnitaiStat5,o acknowledged that a
capital defendant deserves the uncoerced verdict of the jury.6' Still, the Fourth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in A U allowed the use of supplemental
jury instructions.62 The Fourth Circuit stated that A ien charges are "within the
discretion of the trial or sentencing court. 63
According to the Fourth Circuit, the issue was "whether the instruction
given by the trial court in its context and under all the circumstances was coer-
cive."" The Fourth Crcuit agreed with the Court of Appeals of Maryland
finding that the instructions of the sentencing judge "were designed to encourage
further deliberations, not to coerce jurors in the minorityto change their vote. 65
The court also found no other evidence of coercion, such as excessive or unrea-
sonable time spent bythe juryon deliberations." The Fourth Circuit noted that
the sentencing judge "did not advise the jury that a unanimous verdict was




58. Id at 581.
59. BoEl IV, 288 F.3d at 580-81; MD. CODE ANN., CUMS AND PUNISHMENTh S
413(k)(2) (1996) (-If the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able to agree as to sentence, the court
shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.").
60. 164 US. 492 (1896).
61. BomdElIV, 288 F.3d at 580 (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241 (1988));
seeA #, 164 US. at 501-02 (allowing a supplemental charge given by the court when the jury has
reached a stalemate in its deliberations and is incapable of reaching an agreement).
62. Boeb-EIIV, 288 F.3d at 580 (citing A//e, 164 US. at 501-02).
63. Id
64. Idat581 (quotingLou&#W 484 U.S. at237).




required."67 Thus, the Fourth arcuit determined that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the sentencing court to issue the A/l/m charge.6
C BOScataP=rg
Booth-El was found guiltyof muirder in the first degree before the sentenc-
ing phase even began.69 Under Maryland law, it is permissible to "consider
principalship, along with the aggravators and mitigators, in a single stmr9
proceeding."7 The Fourth Circuit noted that the states are allowed to select,
within the confines of the Constitution, what procedure to use in death penalty
proceedings."' The Maryland Court of Appeals'determination that Booth-El was
not denied due process was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of




The Fourth CGcuit held that neither of Booth-El's claims of ineffective
assistance provided a basis for habeas relief.74 The court relied on StridkLai v
Wash~i for its decision.76 There, the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-pronged test to determine whether an ineffective counsel claim is
available in a capital case." The first requirement is that the defendant must
illustrate that counsel's performance was lacking.78 Second, the defendant must
show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense.' The defen-
dant must meet both conditions in order to claim that the conviction or death
sentence was unconstitutionallyobtained.8s Specifically, Booth-El argued that his
lawyers were ineffective because they failed to present evidence that one knife
67. Id
68. Bo/EIIV, 288 F3d at 582.
69. Id
70. Id (emphasis added). In Marylnd, principalship, or being the actual slayer, is a predicate
to a death sentence. MD. CODE ANN., QUMES AND PUMISHMENTS 5 413(e)(1) (1996). In effect,
pricipalship in Mayland serves a function similar to that served byVirginia Code Section 182-18,
the Virginia triggerman" rule. SwVA. CODE ANN. S 182-18 (Michie Supp. 2002); see bfm text
accompanying notes 92-95.
71. Bood.EIV, 288 F.3d at 582.
72. Id at 582-83.
73. Id at 574.
74. Id at 583.
75. 466 US. 668 (1984).
76. BoD-El IV, 288 F.3d at 583; see Stricdand v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 687 (1984)
(holding that a defendant must show counsel's deficient performance and that this performance
prejudiced the defense before a sentence or conviction will be overturned).






found at the scene could have been used to kill both of the Bronsteins. 1 During
the 1990 sentencing proceeding, Booth-El presented a forensic expert who
testified that the second knife was not used to kill either of the Bronsteins. s2
Nonetheless, even after hearing the forensic expert, the sentencing jury still
concluded that Booth-El should be sentenced to death for Mr. Bronstein's
murder.8 3 Based on this later jury finding, the Fourth Crcuit found that the
district court properlyheld that Booth-El failed to meet the second prong of the
Stfi&krdtest because the outcome of the original guilt-innocence trial would not
have been changed had that same evidence been presented. 4
The Fourth Circuit also found Booth-El's second argument lacking." The
court found that Booth-El's attomeymade a tactical decision to preserve the jury
that had been selected and there was no evidentiary proof that counsel acted




According to Maryland Code Section 413(e) (1), the sentencing judge or jury
in a first degree murder case determines whether the defendant was a principal
in the first degree in the same proceeding at which it decides whether to impose
the death penalty" Maryland Code Section 413(e) (1) requires that the defendant
be a principal in the first-degree to be eligible for the death penalty, 9 In Virginia,
the system is different from Maryland's in that the question of principalship is
determined in the guilt-innocence phase." Therefore, the bifurcation issue has
no application in Virginia.
B. Ex PostFacto
The Fourth Circuit recognized the existence of the fourth ex post facto
category, but held that Booth-El's claim did not fall within it.9' When faced with
a capital case in which the passage of a legislative enactment or existing case law
could lead to an ex post facto argument, a practitioner now has a mechanism to




85. Id at 584.
86. Id
87. Bamf>EIIV, 288 F.3d at 584.
88. MD. CODE ANN., QRUAES AND PULMSIERNS 413(e)(1) (19%).
89. Id
90. VA. CODE ANN. S 182-18 (Mihie Supp. 2002).
91. BmEIIV, 288 F3d at 580.
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bar its application. Whether the ex post facto issue is substantive, evidentiaryor
procedural, objections or motions must be made at the earliest opportunity. If,
for example, a change in the law of rape alters the mode of proving that offense,
a defendant indicted under Code Section 18.2-31(5) should move in limine to
require the Commonwealth to prove rape under the prior law?2 Of course, these
objections or motions must also be renewed at every opportunity. Otherwise,
the claim will be procedurally defaulted on direct appeal and in federal habeas
proceedings.
It is interesting that the Fourth Crcuit chose to deny relief to Booth-El
under S 2254 rather than byrelying on Ta*teu Law." , ,mwas decided eight
years after the final Maryland judgment. Booth-El was, therefore, seeking
retroactive application of the Cnmdl rule in collateral proceedings. Tague bars
relief in those circumstances unless the case falls within the two Teaige excep-
tions.
In Hon v Bas, the United States Supreme Court held, in effect, that
Tague trumps AEDPA.Y A federal habeas court must decide first whether a
rule, such as the CmW! rule, is retroactive. Typically, rules are not found to be
retroactive and the habeas petitioner loses. If the rule is retroactive under Tesgue,
the S 2254 analysis- "unreasonable application" or "contrary to"- must be
conducted?
C Allen 0=
Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(E), which is similar to Maryland Code
Section 413(k)(2), states that "[in] the event the jury cannot agree as to the
penalty, the court shall dismiss the jury, and impose a sentence of imprisonment
for life."" Practitioners should be aware that the Fourth Circuit permits judges
92. VA. GODE ANN. S 181-31(5) (M hie Supp. 2002) (describing capital murder, punishable
as a Class 1 felony, as "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the
commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible
sodomy or object sexual penetration").
93. Teague v. Lane, 489 US. 288, 311 (1989) (excepting rules prohibitg punishment for
private, primary individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal Jaw making authority to
proscribe and rules that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty from those "new rules" a
prisoner seeks to enforce in a federal habeas corpus proceeding);sw28 US.C S 2254 (2000) (setting
forth evidentiary requirements for writ of habeas corpus).
94. Boo&EIIV, 288 F.3d at 577.
95. Taaig 489 US. at 306-08.
96. 122 S. Ct. 2147 (2002).
97. Horn v. Banks, 122 S. O 2147,2151 (2002) (holding that when the state makes a Trw
argument, retroactivity becomes a threshold question that federal court must address); seeJanice L.
Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 133 (2002) (analyzing Horn v. Banks, 122 S. a. 2147 (2002)).
98. 28 US.C 5 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to a state
court decision may be granted only if the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of dearly established federal law).
99. VA. GODE ANN. 192-264.4(E) Mchie 2000).
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to give an A fen charge if it is not coercive in "context and under all the circum-
stances." 10 If the judge does give an A/en charge, and uses a word such as
"ought" which might be construed as coercive, an objection must be made to
preserve the issue for review. It should also be noted that if a judge gives an
A ien charge that comments on the evidence, a motion for mistrial or a motion
for curative instructions should be made.'
V. Ccnhasin
The ex post facto issue is the most important part of this case. After Cmdl
and Bo&E, virtually any alteration in Vginia capital law or procedure should
be examined through the ex post facto lens. If the alteration can be placed
within Cam&s fourth category, the ex post facto issue should be raised at every
appropriate step in the case.
Priya Nath
100. Boor-EIIV, 288 F.3d at 581(quoting Lo fd484 Us. at 237).
101. Virginia practitioners should be aware that judges are not permitted to comment on the
evidence. SMazer v. Gommonwealrh 128 S.E. 514, 515 (1925) (stating that "the judge ... in a
criminal case gives great weight with the juryto his words and conduct, and it is incumbent upon
him to guard against anymanifestation of his opinion either upon the weight of the evidence or the
credbility of the witnesses").
[Vol. 15:1
